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Abstract
We revisit the notions of robustness introduced by Abdalla, Bellare, and Neven
(TCC 2010), and related-key attack (RKA) security raised by Bellare, Cash,
and Miller (ASIACRYPT 2011). In the setting of public-key encryption (PKE),
robustness means that it is hard to produce a ciphertext that is valid for two
different users, while RKA security means that a PKE scheme is still secure even
when an attacker can induce modifications in a decryption key, and subsequently
observe the outcome of this PKE scheme under this modified key. In this paper,
we firstly explore the relationship between RKA security and various notions of
robustness (weak, strong, complete, and so so), We show, there is no implication
between weak (strong) robustness and RKA security while complete robustness
implies some kind of RKA security but is not implied by RKA security; besides
complete robustness, there exist other ROB definitions that can imply RKA
security if they meet some security requirements. This result provides a different
framework enabling the construction of PKE schemes that are secure under the
restricted related key attacks. Lastly, we instantiate how a robust PKE scheme
achieves RKA security, and compare it with other existing ways of achieving
RKA security in public-key setting.
Keywords: Robustness, Related-key attack, Public-key encryption.
1. Introduction
The crucial security requirement of encryption is providing privacy of the
encrypted data, i.e. data privacy. To capture various requirements of data
privacy, formalizations like indistinguishability or non-malleability [17] under
either chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) [19] or chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA)
are proposed. In recent years, user privacy has become an equally relevant
concern, which leads to anonymity, to be another pursued goal in encryption
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schemes. Anonymity, also known as key privacy, was introduced in [4], meaning
that a ciphertext does not leak any information about the public key under
which it was created, thereby making the communication anonymous. Under
this scenario, a fundamental question was raised in [1]: how does a legal user
know whether or not an anonymous ciphertext is intended for him or her?
Furthermore, what will happen if a decryption key on a ciphertext was not
created for it? To address this issue, robustness was put forward in [1], which
guarantees that decryption fails with high possibility if the “wrong” decryption
key is used.
1.1. Robust Encryption
Robustness (ROB) ensures a property that a ciphertext cannot be correctly
decrypted under two different decryption keys, which has been implicitly used
in applications such as bid privacy [25], consistency in searchable encryption
[12], anonymous broadcast encryption [3, 21], and anonymous hybrid encryp-
tion [23], but the formal definitions was detailed in [1] which introduced two
kinds of robustness in encryption: weak robustness (WROB) and strong ro-
bustness (SROB). Later, stronger notions called unrestricted strong robustness
(USROB), full robustness (FROB), key-less robustness (KROB), mixed robust-
ness (XROB), and complete robustness (CROB) [18] were put forward to pro-
vide robustness guarantees in more challenging settings such as the encryption
of key-dependent messages [10] or messages encrypted under related keys [6].
WROB can precisely address the issue of using the wrong key that arises in
the anonymity contexts such as anonymous broadcast encryption [3, 21], but
SROB trumps WROB for applications where ciphertexts can be viciously cho-
sen and goes farther towards making encryption mis-use resistant. CROB is
obtained by progressively removing various restrictions on adversarial capabili-
ties in the strong robustness security model. First, the adversary is given access
to honestly generated secret keys and arrive at an intermediate notion named
unrestricted (strong) robustness (USROB). Next, the honest key-generation re-
quirement is removed to get to the notion of full robustness (FROB). Since full
robustness can be viewed as the “decryption-only part” of CROB, another nat-
ural notion of robustness called key-less robustness (KROB) arises as the dual
notion corresponding to the “encryption-only part” of CROB. Finally, XROB
is a “mixed” notion derived from FROB and KROB which is regarded as a
useful tool in establishing results about these notions. CROB is the strongest
notion among all these notions, different from WROB, SROB and USROB, in
CROB the adversary can maliciously generate ciphertexts and the public keys;
different from FROB, KROB, and XROB, CROB requires the behavior of the
encryption and decryption routines of a scheme with respect to each other.
1.2. RKA Security
In practice, an attacker might induce modifications in a hardware-stored
key by fault injection [9] or other means. When the attacker can subsequently
observe the outcome of the cryptographic primitive under this modified key,
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we have a related-key attack (RKA). RKA was first conceived as tools for the
cryptanalysis of blockciphers [20, 8], but the ability of attackers to modify keys
stored in memory via tampering [13, 9] raises concerns that RKA can actually
be mounted to a master key of identity-based encryption (IBE), a signing key of
a certificate authority, or a decryption key, making RKA security important for
a wide variety of primitives. In this paper, the primitive we target is public-key
encryption (PKE), of which the RKA security under chosen ciphertext attacks
(CC-RKA security) was defined by Bellare, Cash, and Miller [5].
Efforts to achieve RKA security have been made on a variety of crypto-
graphic primitives [22, 2, 5, 26, 7] such as identity-based encryption, public-key
encryption, symmetric encryption, signature. Lucks [22] presented some con-
structions for block ciphers and pseudorandom function generators. Applebaum,
Harnik and Ishai [2] put forward symmetric encryption schemes secure against
linear related-key attacks. Bellare, Cash and Miller [5] proposed the approaches
to build high-level primitives secure against related-key attacks. Wee [26] de-
signed the CCA secure public-key encryption schemes which are resilient against
linear related-key attacks under standard assumptions in the standard model.
Bellare, Paterson and Thomson [7] provided a generic framework enabling the
RKA-secure identity-based encryption schemes for sets of related-key derivation
functions beyond the linear barrier.
1.3. Our Contributions
In this paper, firstly, we study how these notions of robustness as WROB,
SROB, CROB relate to RKA security in the setting of public-key encryption.
Regarding that the related-key attack is on the decryption key, we are consid-
ering their security models under chosen ciphertext attacks. In other words,
we talk about the relations between WROB-CCA, SROB-CCA, CROB and
CC-RKA under public-key encryption. Figure 1 summarizes the main relations
between them. In this figure, the relations among the notions of robustness have
been proved in [18], so our emphasis is to explore the relations between them
and CC-RKA security. We conclude that neither WROB-CCA nor SROB-CCA
has relations with CC-RKA, and CROB implies but is not implied by CC-RKA
regarding to the restricted related-key attacks, where for a related decryption
key, there always exists a corresponding related encryption key, of which the
definition we will explain later in Section 3.1.
Next, we investigate under the restricted related-key attacks, whether there
are other ROB notions that are weaker than CROB but strong enough imply
CC-RKA security under the public-key setting. We start from analyzing the
relations between other existing ROB notions defined in [18]: unrestricted strong
robustness (USROB), full robustness (FROB), key-less robustness (KROB), and
mixed robustness (XROB) and CC-RKA security, and sketch our results in
Figure 1. During this exploration, we find some interesting results: there do
exist other ROB notions that can achieve CC-RKA security, but they need to
satisfy two security properties, of which one is the well known CCA security
and the other one is termed by us as malicious key attack (MKA) security. We















































Figure 1: Relations between ROB notions and CC-RKA security.
necessity of CCA security is obvious as RKA security is introduced to resist
the attacks on the decryption key. To prove the importance of MKA security
in making a robust public-key encryption scheme RKA secure, we show that
both WROB and SROB can achieve CC-RKA security if they are MKA secure;
besides, the existing ROB notions that can imply RKA security have MKA
security in common.
Table 1: Achieving the restricted RKA security from ROB notions. Denote© by the meaning
of “satisfy”, × by the meaning of “fails to satisfy”, ∧ by the meaning that it can be implied
if satisfying both of the other two, and Xby the meaning of “imply”.
CCA security MKA security CC-RKA security
WROB-CCA © × ∧
SROB-CCA © × ∧
USROB-CCA © × ∧
FROB © © X
KROB × © ∧
XROB © © X
CROB © © X
Lastly, we take an example to talk about how a robust scheme achieves RKA
security under chosen ciphertext attacks, and compare it with other existing
methods for the achievement of RKA security.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline
the concepts and definitions associated to this work. In Section 3, we elaborate
the security models of related-key attacks and three kinds of robustness. In
Section 4, we summarize the relations between RKA security and various kinds
of ROB notions under the setting of CCA security. In Section 5, we use a robust
public-key encryption scheme to show how it achieves RKA security. Finally,
we conclude this paper in Section 6.
4
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some basic notions and definitions about public-key
encryption schemes and commitment schemes.
2.1. Public-Key Encryption Scheme
A public-key encryption scheme PKE is composed of the following four algo-
rithms [5]: parameter generation algorithm PG, key generation algorithm KG,
encryption algorithm Enc, and decryption algorithm Dec.
 PG(1λ) → pars: Taking a security parameter λ as input, this algorithm
outputs the public parameters pars.
 KG(pars) → (ek, dk): Taking the public parameters pars as input, this
algorithm outputs an encryption key ek and a decryption key dk.
 Enc(pars, ek, m)→ C: Taking the public parameters pars, an encryption
key ek, and a message m as input, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext C.
 Dec(pars, ek, dk, C) → m/⊥: Taking the public parameters pars, an
encryption key ek, a decryption key dk, and a ciphertext C as input, this
algorithm outputs m for a valid ciphertext or ⊥ for an invalid ciphertext.
We require that PKE is correct if for any λ ∈ N, pars ← PG(1λ), (ek, dk)
← KG(pars), and C ← Enc(pars, ek, m), we have that Dec(pars, ek, dk, C)
= m.
AI-CCA Security. Following the definition described in [1], we briefly
revisit the game of AI-CCA security, which models the usual indistinguishability
and anonymity under chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA and ANON-CCA) of
a PKE scheme PKE in a single game. The advantage of an adversary algorithm
A in the AI-CCA game is defined as
AdvAI-CCAPKE (A) = |2 · Pr[AI-CCA
A
PKE ⇒ true]− 1|,
where game AI-CCA is shown in Figure 2. Note that to achieve the IND-







1 ) in the AI-CCA security game.
2.2. Commitment Scheme
A commitment scheme CME is composed of the following three algorithms
[5]: parameter generation algorithm CPG, committal algorithm Com and de-
terministic verification algorithm Ver.
 CPG(1λ)→ cpars: Taking a security parameter λ as input, this algorithm
outputs the public parameters cpars.
 Com(cpars, x) → (com, dec): Taking a the public parameters caprs and
data x as input, this algorithm outputs a commitment com to x along
with a decommittal key dec.
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proc Initialize proc Dec(C, ek)
pars ← PG(1λ); b ← {0, 1} If ek /∈ U then return ⊥
S, T, U, V ← ∅; Return pars If (ek, C) ∈ T then return ⊥
proc GetEK(id) M ← Dec(pars, ek, dk, C)
(ek, dk) ← KG(pars) Return M
U ← U ∪ {ek} proc LR(ek∗0 , ek∗1 , M∗0 , M∗1 )
Return ek If (ek∗0 /∈ U) ∨ (ek∗1 /∈ U) then return ⊥
proc GetDK(ek) If (ek∗0 ∈ V ) ∨ (ek∗1 ∈ V ) then return ⊥
If ek /∈ U then return ⊥ If |M∗0 | 6= |M∗1 | then return ⊥
If ek ∈ S then return ⊥ C∗ ← Enc(pars, ek∗b , M∗b ) then return ⊥
V ← V ∪ {ek}; Return dk S ← S ∪ {ek∗0 , ek∗1}
proc Finalize(b′) T ← T ∪ {(ek∗0 , C∗), (ek∗1 , C∗)}
Return (b′ = b) Return C∗
Figure 2: Game defining AI-CCA security for PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec). Denote S by
public keys involved in the challenge phase, T by the pairs of public key and ciphertext in
the challenge phase, U by the registered user (public key) set, V by the set of the registered
public keys with corresponding private keys. Here GetEK(id) can be removed from this game,
and we keep them to make it consistent with the following security games and convenient for
the later description.
 Ver(cpars, x, com, dec) → 1/0: Taking the public parameter cpars, data
x, a commitment com, and a decommittal key dec as input, this algorithm
outputs 1 to indicate that accepts or 0 to indicate that it rejects.
We call that CME is correct if for any λ ∈ N, x ∈ {0, 1}∗, cpars← CPG(1λ),
(com, dec) ← Com(cpars, x), we have that Ver(cpars, x, com, dec) = 1.
In most schemes the decommittal key is the randomness used by the commit-
tal algorithm and verification is by re-applying the committal function, which
ensures uniqueness. The advantages
AdvHidingCMT (A) = 2 · Pr[Hiding
A
CMT ⇒ true]− 1, and
AdvBindingCMT (A) = Pr[Binding
A
CMT ⇒ true]
referring to the games of the standard hiding and binding properties, respec-
tively, are reviewed in Figure 3.
3. Modeling RKA Security and Robustness
In this section, we briefly revisit the security models of related-key attack
security and three kinds of robustness security, respectively.
3.1. RKA Security
Related-key deriving functions. Our definition follows the notion of
related-key deriving (RKD) functions given in [6]. A class Φ = (P, Q) of related-
key deriving functions is a pair of algorithms: parameter generation algorithm
P and evaluation algorithm Q, of which the second is deterministic.
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proc Initialize proc Initialize
cpars ← CPG(1λ); b ∈ {0, 1} cpars ← CPG(1λ)
Return cpars Return cpars
proc LR(x0, x1) proc Finalize(com, x0, dec0, x1, dec1)
(com, dec) ← Com(cpars, xb) d0 ← Ver(cpars, x0, com, dec0)
Return com d1 ← Ver(cpars, x1, com, dec1)
proc Finalize(b′) Return (x0 6= x1 ∧ d0 = 1 ∧ d1 = 1)
Return (b′ = b)
Figure 3: Game HidingCMT (left) achieves the hiding property and Game BindingCMT (right)
achieves the binding property. Note that LR can only be called once.
 P(1λ) → pars: On input a security parameter λ, parameter generation
algorithm P produces parameters pars.
 Q(pars, dk, φ) → dk′/⊥: On input the parameters pars, a key dk and a
description φ of a related-key deriving function, the evaluation algorithm
Q returns either a modified key dk′ or ⊥.
We require that for all φ, pars, either Q(pars, dk, φ) = ⊥ for all dk or for
no dk. We let Φpars,φ(·) = Q(pars, ·, φ).
Restricted related-key attacks. To simplify the description in this paper,
we give a definition of related-key deriving (RKD) functions for the restricted
related-key attacks, called restricted RKD functions. Let DK be the decryption
key space and dk ∈ DK be a decryption key. Let EK be the encryption key
space and ek ∈ EK be an encryption key. A class Φ of restricted RKD functions
is a class of related-key deriving functions that satisfies the following properties.
 Malleability. Given an RKD function φ ∈ Φ, and a decryption key dk ∈
DK, there should exist an algorithm which outputs a decryption key dk′
under φ that is distributed identically to the output of Q(pars, dk, φ).
 Compatibility. Given an RKD function φ ∈ Φ, an encryption key ek ∈
EK, and a decryption key dk ∈ DK, there should exist a key generation
algorithm KG(pars) outputting a key pair (dk′, ek′) 6= (dk, ek) ∈ (EK,
DK) that equals dk′ ←Q(pars, dk, φ) and its corresponding ek′ generated
via running some RKD function on ek.
 Collision resistance. Given RKD functions φ1, φ2 ∈ Φ, and a decryption
key dk ∈ DK, dk1 generated under Q(pars, dk, φ1) should not be equal
to dk2 generated under Q(pars, dk, φ1) if φ1 6= φ2.
Note that a lot of key generation algorithms can meet this kind of require-
ments, but there do exist some algorithms that cannot achieve these conditions.
For instance, in RSA encryption algorithm [24], if the decryption key is modified,
it is possible that no corresponding encryption key can be found.
CC-RKA Security. On the basis of the games describing RKA security
under the chosen ciphertext attacks in [5], we define the games of CC-RKA
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security for a public-key encryption scheme PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) in
Figure 4.
proc Initialize proc Dec(φ, C)
b ← {0, 1}; C∗ ← ⊥; pars ← PG(1λ) dk′ ← Φpars,φ(dk)
Return pars If dk′ = ⊥ then return ⊥
proc GetEK(id) If ((dk′ = dk) ∧ (C = C∗))
(ek, dk) ← KG(pars); Return ek then return ⊥
proc LR(m0, m1) Return M ← Dec(pars, dk′, C)
If (|m0| 6= |m1|) then return ⊥ proc Finalize(b′)
Return C∗ ← Enc(pars, ek, mb) Return (b = b′)
Figure 4: Game defining CC-RKA security for PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec). Note that LR
can only be called once.
We say that PKE is CC-RKA secure if the advantage
AdvCC-RKAPKE,Φ (A) = 2 · Pr[CC-RKA
A
PKE ⇒ true]− 1
is negligible for any adversary algorithm A.
3.2. Robustness
proc Initialize proc Finalize(O, ek0, ek1, K)
U, V ← ∅; pars ← PG(1λ) If (ek0 /∈ U) ∨ ((ek1 /∈ U))
Return pars then return false
proc GetEK(id)//W, (U)SROB If (ek1 ∈ V ) ∨ ((ek1 ∈ V ))//W, SROB
(ek, dk) ← KG(pars) then return false
U ← U ∪ {ek} If (ek0 = ek1) then return false
Return ek For O = M , K = ⊥//WROB
proc GetDK(ek)//W, (U)SROB M0 ← M ; C ← Enc(pars, ek0, M0)
If ek /∈ U then return ⊥ M1 ← Dec(pars, ek1, dk1, C)
V ← V ∪ {ek} For O = C
Return dk For K = ⊥//(U)SROB
proc Dec(C, ek)//W, (U)SROB For K = {dk0, dk1}//FROB
If ek /∈ U then return ⊥ M0 ← Dec(pars, ek0, dk0, C)
M ← Dec(pars, ek, dk, C) M1 ← Dec(pars, ek1, dk1, C)
Return M Return (M0 6= ⊥) ∧ (M1 6= ⊥)
Figure 5: Game defining WROB, (U)SROB and FROB for PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec).
Robustness is put forth to ensure that it is hard to produce a ciphertext that
is valid for two different public keys, which helps to make anonymous encryption
more misuse resistant. Following the definitions of SROB and WROB given in
[1], we describe them under the CCA security model in the setting of a public-
key encryption scheme PKE in Figure 5. WROB in the setting of CCA security
(WROB-CCA) follows the SROB-CCA game except that in the Finalize phase,
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the adversary in WROB-CCA produces a message M , and C is its encryption
under the encryption key of one of the given identities, while in SROB-CCA it
produces C directly, and may not obtain it as an honest encryption.
Next, we review the security model of CROB (CROB) for a public-key en-
cryption scheme PKE in Figure 6. CROB is obtained by progressively removing
various restrictions on adversarial capabilities in the strong robustness secu-
rity model. First, the adversary is given access to honestly generated secret
keys, which forms unrestricted (strong) robustness (USROB). Next, the honest
key-generation requirement is removed to get to the notion of full robustness
(FROB). Since full robustness can be viewed as the “decryption-only part” of
CROB, another natural notion of robustness called key-less robustness (KROB)
arises as the dual notion corresponding to the “encryption-only part” of CROB.
Finally, XROB is a “mixed” notion derived from FROB and KROB which is
regarded as a useful tool in establishing results about these notions.
proc Initialize proc Finalize()//CROB
List ← ∅ For (ek0, M0, C0), (ek1, M1, C1) ∈ List
pars ← PG(1λ) If (C0 = C1 6= ⊥) ∧ (ek0 6= ek1) ∧
Return pars (M0 6= ⊥ ∧M1 6= ⊥) return true
proc Enc(ek, M , r)//CROB Return false
C ← Enc(pars, ek, M ; r) proc Finalize(M0, M1, ek0, ek1, r0, r1)//KROB
List ← (ek, M , C) ∪ List ((M0, C1, ek0, ek1, r0, dk1))//XROB
proc Dec(ek, dk, C)//CROB If (ek0 = ek1) then return false
M ← Dec(pars, ek, dk, C) C0 ← Enc(pars, ek0, M0; r0)
List ← (ek, M , C) ∪ List C1 ← Enc(pars, ek1, M1; r1)//KROB
(M1 ← Dec(pars, ek1, dk1, C1))//XROB
Return (C0 = C1 6= ⊥)//KROB
(∧(M0 6= ⊥) ∧ (M1 6= ⊥))//XROB
Figure 6: Game defining CROB, FROB, KROB, and XROB for PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec).
The WROB, SROB, USROB, FROB, KROB, XROB and CROB advantages




4. Relations Between CC-RKA Security and Notions of ROB-CCA
In this section, we study how the RKA security relates to various notions of
robustness under chosen ciphertext attacks.
4.1. From CC-RKA Security to Robustness
Theorem 1. A CC-RKA secure public-key encryption scheme does not imply
WROB-CCA security, SROB-CCA security, and CROB security.
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Proof. It is indicated in [1] that WROB-CCA security is the weakest one among
the three robustness definitions, so if a CC-RKA secure public-key encryption
scheme is not WROB-CCA secure, then it is definitely neither SROB-CCA
secure nor CROB secure. To prove this, we can show that there exists a CC-
RKA secure PKE scheme which is insecure in the WROB-CCA security model.
In order to cover comprehensively, we use two different cases of RKA secure
PKE schemes to discuss their robustness.
 For a query (φ, C) to the decryption oracle, if φ(dk) 6= dk, some message
rather than ⊥ will be returned. In this case, it is straightforward that
an adversary can simply win the robustness game, thus this kind of RKA
secure schemes are not robust.
 For a query (φ, C) to the decryption oracle, if φ(dk) 6= dk, ⊥ will be
returned. In this case, we assume that there is a PKE scheme which is re-
silient to related-key attacks, but it fails to achieve even weak robustness.
Let PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) be a CC-RKA secure pubic-key encryp-
tion scheme (for instance, the CCA secure public-key encryption scheme
in [26]). Given PKE and a redundancy code RED = (RKG, RC, RV)
[1], the encryption with redundancy transform associates to them another
encryption scheme PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec). Let K be a key gener-
ated by the redundancy key generation algorithm RKG, and add K to the
public parameters of the above scheme to generate the public parameters
for PG. KG runs the same as KG. Let r̄ be the redundancy generated by
the redundancy computation algorithm RC as r̄ ← RC(K, ek||M), and
replace m by m||r̄ in Enc to generate Enc. Now to decrypt a ciphertext
C, Dec runs as follows: Run Dec((pars, K), ek, dk, C) to obtain M ||r̄. If
RV(K, ek||M , r̄) = 1, outputs M . Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Thus, according to [1], we obtain an anonymous public-key encryption
scheme PKE . Next, to show a counterexample for WROB, we modify it
to an encryption scheme PKE∗ = (PG∗, KG∗, Enc∗, Dec∗), which differs
with PKE only in the decryption phase. To decrypt a ciphertext C, Dec∗
runs as follows: Run Dec∗(pars, ek, dk, C) to obtain M . If M = ⊥,
outputs M = M∗(pars)||RC(ε, ek||M∗(pars); 0l). If RV(ε, ek||M∗(pars),
RC(ε, ek||M∗(pars); 0l)) = 1, outputs M∗(pars). Otherwise, outputs ⊥.
Here, RED is actually an unkeyed redundancy code [1], which can be
simply replaced by a collision resistant hash function H. This, to some
degree, reflects that AI-CCA does not imply WROB-CCA [1].
This resulting scheme PKE is still CC-RKA secure (the examples of
the proof about CC-RKA security mostly follows that in [26, 15]), since
for all the RKA decryption queries, if the decryption result of m is ⊥,
m∗(pars)||RC(ε, ek||m∗(pars); 0l) will be returned rather than ⊥, which
reveals nothing about mb in the challenge ciphertext.
However, PKE is not WROB-CCA following the attack in [1]. For id0, id1
of distinct identities of its choice, adversary algorithm A, on input (pars,
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ε), makes queries ek0 ← GetEK(id0) and ek1 ← GetEK(id1) and returns
(id0, id1, m
∗(pars)). Let dk1 be the decryption key corresponding to ek1,
we can show how the adversary breaks the WROB-CCA security of PKE .
Let r0 ← RC(ε, ek0||m∗(pars)) and C ← Enc(pars, ek0, m∗(pars)||r0).
The security of PKE implies that the result of Dec(pars, ek1, dk1, C)
is m∗(pars)||r1(pars) where r1(pars) = RC(ε, ek1||m∗(pars); 0l), and
the correctness of RED implies that RV(ε, ek1||m∗(pars), r1(pars)) = 1,
therefore Dec((pars, ε), ek1, dk1, C) returns m
∗(pars) rather than ⊥.
Remark 1. CC-RKA security cannot provide any robustness in pubic-key en-
cryption schemes. One reason is that CC-RKA security is not able to guarantee
that for any related key dk′ of a decryption key dk, the decryption of the ci-
phertext C generated under dk’s corresponding encryption key ek on a message
M will failure. For example, the linear related-key attack secure public-key
encryption scheme in [16], where the decryption of C under dk′ returns some
message independent of the original plaintext M . In fact, even this problem
is solved, it still cannot ensure ROB security, as a RKA secure public-key en-
cryption scheme is still RKA secure if its decryption algorithm is modified to
when the decryption fails, a random message in message space will be returned;
whilst in this case, robustness will be totally broken.
4.2. From Robustness to CC-RKA Security
Theorem 2. A WROB-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme does not im-
ply CC-RKA security.
Proof. To prove this, we show that there exists a WROB-CCA secure PKE
scheme which is insecure in the CC-RKA security model. Take the CCA secure
encryption scheme based on the DDH assumption proposed by Cramer and
Shoup [14] for an instance. In [1], it was concluded that the Cramer-Shoup en-
cryption scheme achieves WROB-CCA security, but [26] pointed out two simple
linear related-key attacks on the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme.
Also, we can show that a public-key encryption scheme PKE ′ = (PG′, KG′,
Enc′, Dec′) transformed from a CCA secure public-key encryption scheme PKE
= (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) of which the algorithms are the same as those in Section
2.1, and an integer parameter k (representing the length of K) based on the
weak robustness transform in [1] is not CC-RKA secure.
 PG′(1λ): Run PG(1) to obtain public parameters pars, and choose K
from {0, 1}k. Return (pars, K).
 KG′(pars, K): Run KG(pars) to obtain an encryption and decryption
key pair (ek, dk). Return (ek, dk).
 Enc′((pars, K), ek, M): Run Enc(pars, ek, M ||K) to obtain ciphertext
C. Return C.
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 Dec′((pars, K), ek, dk, C): Run Dec(pars, ek, dk, C) to obtain the
plaintext M∗. If M∗ = ⊥, then return ⊥. Otherwise, decompose M∗ to
M ||K ′. If K ′ = K, then return M ; else return ⊥.
PKE ′ may not be CC-RKA secure. Assume that PKE ′ is CC-RKA secure,
then PKE should be CC-RKA secure as well. Because decryption algorithm Dec′
differs from Dec in the validity of the public parameter K, which is irrelevant
with the keys involved in PKE , and will not make PKE be CC-RKA secure.
Anyway, in the above transform, PKE is a normal public-key encryption scheme,
and it need not to be CC-RKA secure. Another reason of this conclusion is that
a CC-RKA adversary algorithm A may issue a related-key decryption query (φ,
C) such that C decrypted under φ(dk) returns M∗ = M ′||K. Now M ′ will be
returned to algorithm A, but there is no guarantee that M ′ leaks nothing about
M . It could happen that algorithm A obtains M from M ′ according to the
known information.
Remark 2. Here we can find that WROB-CCA security fails to achieve CC-
RKA security is because weak robustness assumes honestly generated public
keys — this makes the encryption under one encryption key decrypted under
another decryption key succeed with negligible possibility, whereas the adver-
sary, under relate-key attacks, could maliciously modify the stored keys such
that there is no idea for the key forms.
Theorem 3. A SROB-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme does not im-
ply CC-RKA security.
Proof. To prove this, we show that there exists a SROB-CCA secure PKE
scheme which is insecure in the CC-RKA security model. In [1], it was proved
that a modified version of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [14] called CS∗
achieves SROB-CCA security, but it is easy to see that the relate-key attacks
on the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [26] also works on CS∗. The reason is
that CS∗ differs from the original Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme by having
Enc choose the randomness u to be non-zero, and then having Dec reject (a1,
a2, c, d) if a1 = 1, which cannot thwart relate-key attacks.
It may be asked for a more general picture about this proof. To start with,
we assume that a SROB-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme implies CC-
RKA security. This is to say, for a public-key encryption scheme PKE , if there
is an adversary algorithm A that breaks the CC-RKA security, then there exists
an adversary algorithm B that wins the SROB-CCA game by outputting (C,
ek, ek′), where (C, ek′) is from a winning RKA decryption query (φ, C) with
the corresponding encryption key ek′ for dk′ = φ(dk). However, there are some
problems here: firstly, both algorithm A and algorithm B have no idea about
dk, thereby it is almost impossible for either of them to obtain dk′ from dk,
not to mention the corresponding ek′; secondly, even algorithm B is given the
access to dk and can compute dk′, the possibility that it makes ek′ a valid key
is negligible. This shows that the assumption that a SROB-CCA secure public-
key encryption scheme implies CC-RKA security is wrong, i.e., a SROB-CCA
secure public-key encryption scheme does not imply CC-RKA security.
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Remark 3. It is not difficult to see that SROB-CCA security fails to achieve
CC-RKA security due to that it requires honest key generation, which excludes,
with high possibility, the case of different users with the keys being related
to each other (i.e., there exists some relations among the keys). This kind of
key leakage information could useful for malicious users to explore the hidden
messages.
Theorem 4. Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is CROB se-
cure. Then PKE is also CC-RKA secure with respect to the restricted RKD
functions.
Proof. Let algorithm A be a CC-RKA adversary. Let C be a ciphertext gener-
ated under an encryption key ek and a message m. Let φ be the RKD function.
To make the proof clear, we divide algorithm A into two types according to its
queries.
1. Type I: There exists at least one Dec(φ, C) query from algorithm A such
that Dec(φ, C) 6= ⊥ and φ(dk) 6= dk. In this case, we can perform the
simulation as follows. Let algorithm S be the challenger of the CROB se-
curity game. We construct a CROB adversary algorithm B, which receives
the parameters pars from S, and answers algorithm A’s various queries
as follows.
 GetEK(id): algorithm B generates a key pair (ek, dk) of encryption
key and decryption key, respectively, and passes ek to algorithm A.
 Dec(φ, C): algorithm B runs Φpars,φ(dk) to obtain dk′, uses dk′ to
compute the corresponding ek′, forwards (ek′, C) to algorithm S to
obtain the result of the decryption, and returns the result to algo-
rithm A. Algorithm B continues the above process until it obtains
an RKA decryption query Dec(φ, C) with Dec(φ, C) 6= ⊥ and φ(dk)
6= dk. We can see how algorithm B wins the CROB security game as
follows. For a query Dec(φ, C) that Dec(φ, C) 6= ⊥ (let m′ denote
this output) and φ(dk) 6= dk, it firstly runs Φpars,φ(dk) to get dk′ and
computes its corresponding encryption key ek′, and then it outputs
(ek, m, C) and (ek′, m′, C).
As a result, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
CROB-CCA
PKE (B).
Note that the restricted related-key attacks plays an important role
here. Obviously, algorithm B cannot simulate the challenger per-
fectly to answer the related-key decryption queries from algorithm
A without the restriction of the RKD functions, because it may not
have the ability to generate the corresponding the encryption keys of
the related decryption keys.
 LR(M0, M1): algorithm B forwards (ek, Mb) where b ∈ {0, 1} to
algorithm S to get the challenge ciphertext C∗, and returns C∗ to
algorithm A.
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2. Type II: Any adversary that is not type I. In other words, for any Dec(φ,
C) queries from algorithmA, Dec(φ, C) =⊥ if φ(dk) 6= dk. In this case, we
can see that the related-key decryption queries do not facilitate algorithm
A, so it can be reduced to the adversary in the IND-CCA security game
in the case of Dec(φ, C) = m, C 6= C∗ and φ(dk) = dk with C∗ being
the challenge ciphertext. Let algorithm S ′ be the challenger of the IND-
CCA security game. We construct an adversary algorithm B′ breaking
the IND-CCA security, which receives the parameters pars from S ′, and
answers algorithm A’s various queries as follows.
 GetEK(id): algorithm S ′ generates a key pair (ek, dk) of encryption
key and decryption key, and sends ek to algorithm B′. Algorithm B′
passes ek to algorithm A.
 Dec(φ, C): algorithm B′ decides whether φ(dk) = dk from the given
φ. If φ(dk) 6= dk, it returns ⊥ to algorithm A; otherwise, it forwards
(ek, C) to algorithm S ′ to obtain the result of the decryption, and
returns the result to algorithm A. Note that C = C∗ and φ(dk) =
dk will be ruled out by the definition of the CC-RKA security game.
 LR(M0, M1): algorithm B′ forwards M0, M1 to algorithm S ′, which
chooses b ∈ {0, 1}, and runs Enc(pars, ek, Mb) to generate the chal-
lenge ciphertext C∗. Algorithm B′ returns C∗ to algorithm A.
Finally, algorithm A outputs a guessing b′ ∈ {0, 1}, and sends b′ to algo-
rithm B′. Algorithm B′ outputs b′ as its guessing of b.
Here, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
IND-CCA
PKE (B′).
It is easy to see that algorithm B runs algorithm A in an environment identi-
cal to CC-RKA, and algorithm B′ runs algorithm A in an environment identical
to IND-CCA. Furthermore, whenever algorithm A wins this game, algorithm B
breaks the CROB security or algorithm B′ breaks the IND-CCA security.
To conclude the proof, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
CROB
PKE (B) + Adv
IND-CCA
PKE (B′).
From the above, it is not difficult to conclude that under chosen ciphertext
attacks, both WROB and SROB are too weak to imply RKA security, while
CROB is strong enough to achieve RKA security. One question might be raised
here: whether there exist other intermediate ROB notions that are weaker than
CROB but sufficient to imply RKA security as well, i.e., these ROB notions are
in between WROB (or SROB) and CROB? Besides CROB, [18] also defined
several other ROB notions: unrestricted strong robustness (USROB), full ro-
bustness (FROB), key-less robustness (KROB), and mixed robustness (XROB).
In the following, we show their relations to RKA security one by one.
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 USROB. It still models the scenarios where keys are honestly generated,
which could not simulate the environment of RKA security. Definitely,
USROB could not achieve CC-RKA security. To prove this, we assume
that a USROB-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme implies CC-
RKA security. This is to say, for a public-key encryption scheme PKE ,
if there is an adversary algorithm A that breaks the CC-RKA security,
then there exists an adversary algorithm B that wins the USROB-CCA
game by outputting (C, ek, ek′), where (C, ek′) is from a winning RKA
decryption query (φ, C) with the corresponding encryption key ek′ for
dk′ = φ(dk). The problem here is that ek′ should be a honestly generated
encryption key according to the property of USROB, so should dk′, which
contradicts with the setting of related-key attacks where there is no such
restriction on dk′. Therefore, our assumption of a USROB-CCA secure
public-key encryption scheme implying CC-RKA security is not right, and
a USROB-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme does not CC-RKA
security.
 FROB. Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is FROB. We
assume that PKE is also CC-RKA secure. To prove this assumption, we
divide algorithm A into two types according to its queries. Let algorithm
A be a CC-RKA adversary. Let C be a ciphertext generated under an
encryption key ek and a message m. Let φ be the RKD function.
1. Type I: There exists at least one Dec(φ, C) query from algorithm A
such that Dec(φ, C) 6= ⊥ and φ(dk) 6= dk. In this case, the same as
that in Theorem 4, the simulation can be performed as follows.
– GetEK(id): The same as that in Theorem 4.
– Dec(φ, C): The same as that in Theorem 4 except in the winning
phase. We can see how algorithm B wins the FROB security
game as follows. For a query Dec(φ, C) that Dec(φ, C) 6= ⊥ (let
m′ denote this output) and φ(dk) 6= dk, it firstly runs Φpars,φ(dk)
to get dk′ and computes its corresponding encryption key ek′,
and then it outputs (C, ek, ek′, dk, dk′).
As a result, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
FROB
PKE (B).
– LR(M0, M1): algorithm B encrypts (ek, Mb) where b ∈ {0, 1} by
running Enc(pars, ek, Mb) to get the challenge ciphertext C
∗,
and returns C∗ to algorithm A.
2. Type II: Any adversary that is not type I. In other words, for any
Dec(φ, C) queries from algorithm A, Dec(φ, C) = ⊥ if φ(dk) 6= dk.
The proof of this part is the same as that in Theorem 4, so we omit
the details here.
It is easy to see that algorithm B runs algorithm A in an environment
identical to CC-RKA, and algorithm B′ runs algorithm A in an environ-
ment identical to IND-CCA. Furthermore, whenever algorithm A wins
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this game, algorithm B breaks the FROB security or algorithm B′ breaks
the IND-CCA security.
To conclude the proof, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
FROB
PKE (B) + Adv
IND-CCA
PKE (B′).
 XROB. Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is XROB. We
assume that PKE is also CC-RKA secure. To prove this assumption, we
divide algorithm A into two types according to its queries. Let algorithm
A be a CC-RKA adversary. Let C be a ciphertext generated under an
encryption key ek and a message m. Let φ be the RKD function.
1. Type I: There exists at least one Dec(φ, C) query from algorithm A
such that Dec(φ, C) 6= ⊥ and φ(dk) 6= dk. In this case, the same as
that in 4, we can carry out the simulation as follows.
– GetEK(id): The same as that in Theorem 4.
– LR(M0, M1): algorithm B encrypts (ek, Mb) where b ∈ {0, 1}
by running Enc(pars, ek, Mb; r) to get the challenge ciphertext
C∗, and returns C∗ to algorithm A.
– Dec(φ, C): The same as that in Theorem 4 except in the winning
phase. Algorithm B continues the decryption query process until
it obtains an RKA decryption query Dec(φ, C∗) with Dec(φ, C∗)
6= ⊥ and φ(dk) 6= dk. We can see how algorithm B wins the
XROB security game as follows. For a query Dec(φ, C∗) that
Dec(φ, C∗) 6= ⊥ (let m′ denote this output) and φ(dk) 6= dk, it
firstly runs Φpars,φ(dk) to get dk
′ and computes its corresponding
encryption key ek′, and then it outputs (Mb, ek, r, C
∗, ek′, dk′).
As a result, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
XROB
PKE (B).
2. Type II: Any adversary that is not type I. In other words, for any
Dec(φ, C) queries from algorithm A, Dec(φ, C) = ⊥ if φ(dk) 6= dk.
The proof of this part is the same as that in Theorem 4, so we omit
the details here.
It is easy to see that algorithm B runs algorithm A in an environment
identical to CC-RKA, and algorithm B′ runs algorithm A in an environ-
ment identical to IND-CCA. Furthermore, whenever algorithm A wins
this game, algorithm B breaks the XROB security or algorithm B′ breaks
the IND-CCA security.
To conclude the proof, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
XROB




 KROB. It does not involve decryption oracle, so it is impossible to achieve
CC-RKA security, which should be analyzed under chosen ciphertext at-
tacks. Note that if we added IND-CCA security to the security game of
KROB, then it is easy to see that KROB becomes similar to CROB, or
we can say that it is a loose definition of CROB security game. There is
no doubt that it can imply CC-RKA security.
Remark 4. From the above analysis, it is easy to conclude that IND-CCA
security plays an important role in achieving CC-RKA security. It is meaningless
to talk about RKA security under a robust public-key encryption scheme which
is not CCA secure.
4.3. MKA Security
Previously, we did an analysis on the relations between various ROB notions
and RKA security. A natural question could be asked: if there is an additional
property that could be added to a WROB scheme to achieve CC-RKA security?
Indeed, there is a notion which we call malicious key attack (MKA) security can
be made use of to obtain CC-RKA security from WROB. We say a robust public-
key encryption scheme is MKA secure, means that it is secure under malicious
key attacks, where an adversary is allowed to adversarially choose the keys in
the system. To prove that an additional property called MKA security is able
to achieve CC-RKA security from a CCA secure public-key encryption scheme
with weak robustness, we modify the security game of WROB, and describe it
Figure 7, which we call stronger weak robustness (SWROB),
proc Initialize proc Finalize(M , ek0, ek1))
pars ← PG(1λ) If (ek0 = ek1) then return false
Return (pars) M0 ← M ; C ← Enc(pars, ek0, M0)
proc Dec(ek, dk, C) M1 ← Dec(pars, ek1, dk1, C)
M ← Dec(pars, ek, dk, C) Return (M0 6= ⊥) ∧ (M1 6= ⊥)
Return M
Figure 7: Game defining SWROB-CCA for PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec).
Theorem 5. Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is SWROB-
CCA secure. Then PKE is also CC-RKA secure with respect to the restricted
RKD functions.
Proof. Let algorithm A be a CC-RKA adversary. Let C be a ciphertext gener-
ated under an encryption key ek and a message m. Let φ be the RKD function.
To make the proof clear, we divide algorithm A into two types according to its
queries.
 Type I: There exists at least one Dec(φ, C) query from algorithm A such
that Dec(φ, C) 6= ⊥ and φ(dk) 6= dk. In this case, we can do the simulation
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as follows. Let algorithm S be the challenger of the SWROB-CCA secu-
rity game. We construct a SWROB-CCA adversary algorithm B, which
receives the parameters pars from S, and answers algorithm A’s various
queries as follows.
– GetEK(id): The same as that in Theorem 4.
– Dec(φ, C): The same as that in Theorem 4 except in the winning
phase. We can see how algorithm B wins the SWROB-CCA security
game as follows. For a query Dec(φ, C) that Dec(φ, C) 6= ⊥ (let m′
denote this output) and φ(dk) 6= dk, it firstly runs Φpars,φ(dk) to get
dk′ and computes its corresponding encryption key ek′, and then it
outputs (m, ek, ek′).
As a result, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
SWROB-CCA
PKE (B).
– LR(M0, M1): algorithm B encrypts (ek, Mb) where b ∈ {0, 1} by
running Enc(pars, ek, Mb) to get the challenge ciphertext C
∗, and
returns C∗ to algorithm A.
 Type II: Any adversary that is not type I. In other words, for any Dec(φ,
C) queries from algorithm A, Dec(φ, C) = ⊥ if φ(dk) 6= dk. The proof of
this part is the same as that in Theorem 4, so we omit the details here.
It is easy to see that algorithm B runs algorithm A in an environment identi-
cal to CC-RKA, and algorithm B′ runs algorithm A in an environment identical
to IND-CCA. Furthermore, whenever algorithm A wins this game, algorithm B
breaks the CROB security or algorithm B′ breaks the IND-CCA security.
To conclude the proof, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
SWROB-CCA
PKE (B) + Adv
IND-CCA
PKE (B′).
In short, SWROB is an improved version of WROB by removing the con-
dition of honest key generation, and differs from CROB in that it allows an
adversary to create a ciphertext that decrypts correctly under another decryp-
tion key. If an adversary wins WROB game, definitely it wins SWROB game;
besides, when an adversary wins SWROB game, definitely it wins CROB game.
However, SWROB does not imply SROB. That is, for a public-key en-
cryption scheme PKE which is SWROB, there exists a scheme PKE ′ which
is SWROB, but fails to be SROB. We define PKE ′ to be the same as PKE
(of which the algorithms are the same as those in Section 2.1) except for the
encryption and decryption algorithms, which will be modified as follows.
 Enc′(pars, ek, M): Run Enc(pars, ek, M) to obtain ciphertext C, and
output 0||C.
 Dec′(pars, ek, dk, c||C): If c = 0, output Dec(pars, ek, dk, C). If c = 1,
output a fixed message M∗ (in the message space for ek).
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PKE ′ is a correct public-key encryption scheme, but it is not SROB-CCA
secure. Suppose that the adversary algorithm A queries KG twice to obtain
two distinct encryption keys ek0 and ek1 with overwhelming probability. Then
algorithm A chooses a random C from the ciphertext space and gives (1||C,
pk0, pk1) as its final output. Obviously, algorithm A wins the game with the
output (ek0, ek1, 1||C) where ek0 6= ek1 which always outputs a valid message
M∗. Anyway, PKE ′ is still SWROB, because the tweaks in the modification
do not affect the SWROB game — the new encryption algorithm just adds a
zero-bit to all ciphertexts.
In order to convince the essentiality in achieving RKA security, we also sim-
ply add MKA security to (U)SROB game to make it become CC-RKA secure,
which we call weak complete robustness (WCROB) because it is very close to
the security game of CROB, and depict its security game in Figure 8. WCROB
is a strengthened definition of SROB by removing the condition of honest key
generation. If an adversary wins (U)SROB game, then it wins WCROB game
as well. Compared to the security game of CROB, WCROB removes the adver-
sary’s interaction with the encryption routine on plaintexts, keys, and random
coins of its choice. If an adversary breaks WCROB security, it breaks CROB
security as well.
proc Initialize proc Finalize(C, ek0, ek1))
pars ← PG(1λ) If (ek0 = ek1) then return false
Return (pars) M0 ← Dec(pars, ek0, dk0, C)
proc Dec(ek, dk, C) M1 ← Dec(pars, ek1, dk1, C)
M ← Dec(pars, ek, dk, C) Return (M0 6= ⊥) ∧ (M1 6= ⊥)
Return M
Figure 8: Game defining WCROB-CCA for PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec).
Theorem 6. Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is WCROB-
CCA secure. Then PKE is also CC-RKA secure with respect to the restricted
RKD functions.
Proof. Let algorithm A be a CC-RKA adversary. Let C be a ciphertext gener-
ated under an encryption key ek and a message m. Let φ be the RKD function.
To make the proof clear, we divide algorithm A into two types according to its
queries.
 Type I: There exists at least one Dec(φ, C) query from algorithm A such
that Dec(φ, C) 6= ⊥ and φ(dk) 6= dk. In this case, the same as that in
Theorem 5, we can do the simulation as follows.
– GetEK(id): The same as that in Theorem 5.
– Dec(φ, C): The same as that in Theorem 4 except in the winning
phase. We can see how algorithm B wins the WCROB-CCA security
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game as follows. For a query Dec(φ, C) that Dec(φ, C) 6= ⊥ (let m′
denote this output) and φ(dk) 6= dk, it firstly runs Φpars,φ(dk) to get
dk′ and computes its corresponding encryption key ek′, and then it
outputs (C, ek, ek′).
As a result, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
WCROB-CCA
PKE (B).
– LR(M0, M1): The same as that in Theorem 5.
 Type II: Any adversary that is not type I. In other words, for any Dec(φ,
C) queries from algorithm A, Dec(φ, C) = ⊥ if φ(dk) 6= dk. The proof of
this part is the same as that in Theorem 4, so we omit the details here.
It is easy to see that algorithm B runs algorithm A in an environment identi-
cal to CC-RKA, and algorithm B′ runs algorithm A in an environment identical
to IND-CCA. Furthermore, whenever algorithm A wins this game, algorithm B
breaks the CROB security or algorithm B′ breaks the IND-CCA security.
To conclude the proof, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
WCROB-CCA




We have seen that both WROB and SROB could not achieve CC-RKA secure
because they are not MKA secure, and FROB, XROB, KROB are already MKA
secure and they imply CC-RKA security; KROB is MKA secure but it fails to
achieve CC-RKA security as it is not secure under chosen ciphertext attacks;
if KROB satisfies IND-CCA security, it becomes a variant security game of
CROB and implies CC-RKA security; when adding MKA security to WROB
and SROB, they can imply CC-RKA security as well. Therefore, we can say
that a robust public-key encryption scheme that implies CC-RKA security under
restricted related-key attacks should be both IND-CCA secure and MKA secure;
otherwise, it could not be resilient to restricted related-key attacks.
If looking deeper to the proof part of all the above theorems, we can find that
algorithm B does the least work in the CROB one for the simulation of queries
from algorithm A, it prevents other adversarial behaviors that could happen in
the ROB security games. This, to some degree, reflects the flexibility of complete
robust, and its strongest property among all the ROB notions. Furthermore, it
convinces the correctness of an underlying public-key encryption scheme.
Let “Enc” be Encryption, “Dec” be decryption, “KG” be key generation,
“Rand” be randomness, “Out ROB” be other attacks outside the ROB model
secure (i.e., the adversary may not follow the encryption or decryption routine of
the original public-key encryption scheme). We summarize the above discussed
ROB notions in Table 2.
Remark 5. As mentioned in [18], CROB is obtained by progressively removing
various restrictions on adversarial capabilities in the strong robustness security
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Table 2: Summary of all the ROB notions
Out Rand dk Enc Dec Access to Honest
ROB output output query query honest dk KG
WROB no no no no yes no yes
SROB no no no no yes no yes
USROB no no no no yes yes yes
FROB no no yes no yes yes no
KROB no yes no yes no yes no
XROB no yes yes yes yes yes no
CROB yes no no yes yes yes no
model, and viewing robustness in terms of the behavior of the encryption and
decryption algorithms with respect to each other. On the other side, in the secu-
rity game of CROB, an adversary is given the shared parameters of the system,
which then arbitrarily interacts with the encryption and decryption routines on
plaintexts, ciphertexts, keys, and even random coins of its choice, which meets
the underlying intuition behind not only the original weak robustness notion,
but also the standard correctness criterion for a PKE scheme, and excludes the
other attacks falling outside the other ROB security models. Due to all these
facts, CROB is a very precise definition, which covers all the other ROB security
games, and is flexible to achieve RKA security.
5. Discussion
In the previous section, we summarize the relations between RKA security
and notions of robustness under PKE setting. Here, we describe a framework for
creating RKA-secure PKE schemes beyond the linear barrier (affine, polynomial,
and so on), and compare it with the method proposed in [7].
5.1. Construction
Given a public-key encryption scheme PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) and a
commitment scheme CMT = (CPG, Com, Ver), we transform them to a public-
key encryption scheme PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) via the strong robustness
transform in [1], of which the algorithms are depicted in Figure 9.
Note that we require ek in Ver(cpars, ek, com, dec) = 1 to be recomputed
by running the key generation algorithm on dk.
5.2. Security Proof
Theorem 7. Let PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) be a secure public-key encryp-
tion scheme, and let PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) be the public-key encryption
scheme resulting from applying the strong robustness transform to PKE and a
commitment scheme CMT = (CPG, Com, Ver). Then
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Algorithm PG(1λ) Algorithm KG(Pars)
pars ← PG(1λ) (ek, dk) ← KG(pars)
cpars ← CPG(1λ) Return (ek, dk)
Return Pars = (pars, cpars) Algorithm Dec((Pars), ek, dk, (C, com))
Algorithm Enc((Pars), ek, M) M ← Dec(pars, ek, dk, C)
(com, dec) ← Com(cpars, ek) If M = ⊥ then return ⊥
C ← Enc(pars, ek, M ||dec) M ||dec ← M
Return (C, com) If (Ver(cpars, ek, com, dec) = 1)
then return M
Else Return ⊥
Figure 9: A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) resulting from applying
strong robustness transform [1] to a public-key encryption scheme PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec)
and a commitment scheme CMT = (CPG, Com, Ver).
1. AI-CCA: Let A be an adversary algorithm against the AI-CCA security of
PKE. Then there is an adversary algorithm W against the WROB-CCA
security of PKE, an adversary algorithm H against the the hiding security
of CMT , and an adversary algorithm B against the AI-CCA security of
PKE such that
AdvAI-CCAPKE (A) ≤ 2 ·Adv
WROB-CCA
PKE (W)
+ 2 ·AdvHidingCMT (H)
+ 3 ·AdvAI-CCAPKE (B).
2. SROB-CCA: Let A be an adversary algorithm against the SROB-CCA
security of PKE making q GetEK queries. Then there is an adversary
algorithm B against the the biding security of CMT such that
AdvSROB-CCAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
Binding




Coll denotes the event that there exist distinct ek0 and ek1 queried by
algorithm S to the GetEK oracle such that the encryption keys returned
in response are the same.
3. CC-RKA: Let A be an adversary algorithm against the CC-RKA security
of PKE under the restricted RKD functions. Then there is an adversary
algorithm I against the the AI-CCA security of PKE, and an adversary
algorithm B against the the binding security of CMT such that
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
AI-CCA
PKE (I) + Adv
Binding
CMT (B).
Proof. The first part of the theorem implies that if PKE is AI-CCA secure
and WROB-CCA secure, and CMT is Hiding secure, then PKE is AI-CCA
secure. The second part of the theorem implies that if CMT is binding secure,
and PKE has low encryption key collision probability then PKE is SROB-CCA
secure. The encryption key collision probability CollPKE of PKE is defined as
the maximum probability that ek0 = ek1 in the following game.
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1. pars ← PG(1λ);
2. (ek0, dk0) ← KG(pars, ek0);
3. (ek1, dk1) ← KG(pars, ek0).
Here the maximum is over all the distinct ek0, ek1. Obviously, PKE being AI-
CCA implies that CollPKE is negligible, so the requirement for low encryption
key collision probability is actually not an extra assumption [1]. Proofs of both
parts follows that of Theorem 4.2 in [1], and we omit the details here.
Proof of Part 3 of Theorem 7: In CC-RKA security game (See Figure 10),
it is required that all the queries issued by the adversary should be responded
with a related decryption key dk′ rather than the original one dk.







pars ← PG(1λ) If (ek∗0 /∈ U) ∨ (ek∗1 /∈ U) then return ⊥
cpars ← CPG(1λ) If (ek∗0 ∈ V ) ∨ (ek∗1 ∈ V ) then return ⊥
b ← {0, 1} (com∗, dec∗) ← Com(cpars, ek∗b )
S,U, V ← ∅; C∗ ← ⊥ C∗ ← Enc(pars, ek∗b , M
∗
b ||dec∗)
com∗ ← ⊥; ek∗0 ← ⊥; ek∗1 ← ⊥ Return (C∗, com∗)
Return (pars, cpars) proc Dec(φ, (C, com), ek)
proc GetEK(id) dk′ ← Φpars,φ(dk)
(ek, dk) ← KG(pars) If (dk′ = dk∗b ) ∧ (C, com) = (C∗, com∗)
U ← U ∪ {ek} then return ⊥
Return ek If (dk′ = dk∗1−b 6= dk∗b ) ∧
proc GetDK(ek) (C, com) = (C∗, com∗) then return ⊥
If ek /∈ U then return ⊥ M ′ ← Dec(pars, ek, dk′, C)
V ← V ∪ {ek} If M ′ = ⊥ then return ⊥
Return dk M ′||dec′ ← M ′
proc Finalize(b′) If Ver(cpars, ek′, com, dec′) = 1
Return (b′ = b′) then return M ′
Else return ⊥
Figure 10: The first game of the proof of Part 3 of Theorem 7. Note that ek′ is the corre-
sponding encryption key of dk′.
The trick here is that for any input (φ, (C, com)) to the decryption oracle,
as long as dk′ 6= dk, a failure symbol ⊥ will be returned. This is guaranteed by
the binding property of the commitment scheme CMT , from which we have
Pr[Ver(cpars, ek′, com, dec′) = 1∧
Ver(cpars, ek, com, dec) = 1] ≤ AdvBindingCMT (B),
where ek′ is related encryption key corresponding to dk′ (note that this can be
achieved if the queries are from the restricted RKD functions). Based on this,
we can modify the process of the first game in the proof of Part 1 of Theorem
7 to that of game G1 (See Figure 11). We can see that the two games becomes
23
equivalent when dk′ = dk, because for all dk′ 6= dk it will return ⊥. At this
level, CC-RKA security becomes consistent to SROB-CCA security. As for
other parts of this proof, we can modify game G1 following the proof of Part 1
of Theorem 7, we omit the details here.
proc Dec((C, com), ek) proc Dec(φ, (C, com), ek) // G1
If ek /∈ U then return ⊥ If ek /∈ U then return ⊥
If (ek = ek∗b ) ∧ (C, com) = (C∗, com∗) dk′ ← Φpars,φ(dk)
then return ⊥ If (dk′ = dk∗b ) ∧ (C, com) = (C∗, com∗)
If (ek = ek∗1−b 6= ek∗b ) ∧ then return ⊥
(C, com) = (C∗, com∗) If (dk′ = dk∗1−b 6= dk∗b ) ∧
then return ⊥ (C, com) = (C∗, com∗) then return ⊥
M ← Dec(pars, ek, dk, C) If (dk′ = dk) then
If M = ⊥ then return ⊥ M ′ ← Dec(pars, ek′, dk′, C)
M ||dec ← M If M ′ = ⊥ then return ⊥
If Ver(cpars, ek, com, dec) = 1 M ′||dec′ ← M ′
then return M If Ver(cpars, ek′, com, dec′) = 1
Else return ⊥ then return M ′
Else return ⊥
Figure 11: Left: The first game of the proof of Part 1 of Theorem 4.2 in [1]. Right: The
second game of the proof of Part 3 of Theorem 7.
To conclude the proof, we have
AdvCC-RKAPKE (A) ≤ Adv
AI-CCA




In the following, we compare our framework of enabling RKA-secure public-
key encryption beyond the linear barrier with the one depicted in [7].
 In [7], one general framework was described for creating RKA-secure
identity-based encryption schemes via Identity Renaming Transform, which
allows to reduce RKA security of a modified identity-based encryption
scheme directly to the normal identity-based encryption security of a base
identity-based encryption scheme. After that, they obtain the first con-
structions of RKA-secure schemes for public-key encryption with CCA se-
curity derived from identity-based encryption via the CHK transform [11].
Our generic method, from a different point of view, constructs RKA-secure
public-key encryption schemes from public-key encryption schemes and
commitment schemes, which reduces RKA security of a modified public-
key encryption scheme to the normal public-key encryption security of this
scheme because of the binding property of the commitment scheme.
 In [7], it is required that the identity-based encryption scheme used to
achieve RKA security should be key malleable with a key simulator and
the renaming scheme is statistically collision-resistant. Our construction
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puts some restrictions on the related-key deriving functions, which we
name as the restricted related-key deriving functions, to perfectly simulate
the proof; otherwise, the proof cannot go well.
To sum up, we can see that achieving RKA security in PKE setting by apply-
ing a transform to a public-key encryption scheme and a commitment scheme
is very convenient yet it can only hold under the restricted RKD functions.
However, a lot of key generation algorithms can meet the requirements of RKD
functions, so it is still a feasible way to achieve RKA secure PKE schemes in
practice.
6. Conclusions
We review the notions of robustness introduced in [1], and related-key at-
tack (RKA) security proposed in [5]. In public-key encryption (PKE) schemes,
robustness means that it is hard to produce a ciphertext that is valid for two
different users, while RKA security means that a PKE scheme is still secure even
when an adversary can modify a stored decryption key and observe outcomes
of the public-key encryption scheme under this modified key. Inspired by this,
in this paper, we put emphasis on thinking whether there are relations between
(weak, strong and complete) robustness and RKA security. After analyzing sev-
eral robust PKE schemes and PKE schemes secure against related-key attacks,
we conclude that there is no implication between weak (strong) robustness and
RKA security, and complete robustness implies the restricted RKA security
but it is not implied by RKA security. This result shows another framework
enabling the construction of PKE schemes that are secure against related-key
attacks beyond the linear barrier. Moreover, we make an analysis on what kind
of properties a robust public-key encryption scheme should satisfy in order to
achieve RKA security. At last, we take an instance of a robust public-key en-
cryption scheme that is secure against related-key attacks, and do a comparison
between this method and other known ways for the achievement of RKA security
in public-key encryption.
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